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Abstract 
In this paper, we investigate the role of incentives for Security Information Sharing (SIS) 
between human agents working in institutions. We present an incentive-based SIS system model 
that is empirically tested with an exclusive dataset. The data was collected with an online 
questionnaire addressed to all participants of a deployed Information Sharing and Analysis 
Center (ISAC) that operates in the context of critical infrastructure protection (N=262). SIS is 
measured with a multidimensional approach (intensity, frequency) and regressed on five 
specific predicators (reciprocity, value of information, institutional barriers, reputation, trust) 
that are measured with psychometric scales. We close an important research gap by providing, 
to the best of our knowledge, the first empirical analysis on previous theoretical work that 
assumes SIS to be beneficial. Our results show that institutional barriers have a strong 
influence on our population, i.e., SIS decision makers in Switzerland. This lends support to a 
better institutional design of ISACs and the formulation of incentive-based policies that can 
avoid non-cooperative and free-riding behaviours. Both frequency and intensity are influenced 
by the extent to which decision makers expect to receive valuable information in return for SIS, 
which supports the econometric structure of our multidimensional model. Finally, our policy 
recommendations support the view that the effectiveness of mandatory security-breach 
reporting to authorities is limited. Therefore, we suggest that a conducive and lightly regulated 
SIS environment – as in Switzerland – with positive reinforcement and indirect suggestions can 
“nudge” SIS decision makers to adopt a productive sharing behaviour. 
 
 
Key words: security information sharing; incentives; psychometrics; economics of 
information security; behavioural economics 
  
 
 
 
2 
1. Introduction 
 
The vital importance of information systems in almost every aspect of human life implies the 
need for investment in the security of the systems. However, in practice, such cybersecurity 
investments hardly ever reach their theoretical optimum [1,3]. This under-investment causes 
substantial economic costs, risks, and welfare losses [2] and threatens national security [3]. To 
alleviate this problem, cybersecurity research proposes that security information sharing (SIS) 
among human agents should increase cybersecurity investment because such sharing would 
increase information efficiency hence lower investment costs for any given level of 
cybersecurity [3]. 
 SIS is an activity consisting of human agents exchanging cybersecurity-relevant 
information, such as vulnerabilities, phishing, malware, and data breaches, as well as threat 
intelligence analysis, best practices, early warnings, expert advice and general insights [4]. This 
activity is typically organized in processes on public-private platforms (or forums) provided 
by Information Sharing and Analysis Centers (ISACs).2 Further studies confirm the positive 
results of such cooperation for both individual human agents [1,5], government authorities [6], 
market values of firms in the private sector [7], and economic welfare in general [8]. 
 Several game-theoretic models investigate the benefits of SIS for individual agents [3,5]. 
Game theory strategies, such as “tit-for-tat” (an effective strategy for the iterated prisoner’s 
dilemma) suggest positive outcome for SIS, whereas empirical validation is often missing 
[9,10]. We close an important research gap by providing the first-ever empirical analysis based 
on a psychometric approach to previous theoretical work that assumes SIS to be beneficial. For 
our study, we secured access to a Swiss ISAC that has organized SIS between critical 
infrastructure (CI) operators (our population) since 2005. This organization – MELANI3 – is a 
Swiss government-organized ISAC that aims to improve the cybersecurity level of CI operators 
by encouraging them to share security-relevant information. 
 SIS also likely reduces information asymmetry costs that defenders of information systems 
face, making it particularly relevant in the context of the detection of zero-day vulnerabilities 
[8]. Collective intelligence and crowdsourcing studies have shown that organizations which 
cooperate in cyberdefence activities have greater threat awareness [12]. Any individual human 
agent can likely reduce the cost of attaining the optimal level of cybersecurity investment when 
they engage in SIS [13], hence any particular agent should have a strong motivation to act 
accordingly. 
 Cybersecurity threats are particularly relevant for critical infrastructure operators due to the 
extent of the potential loss due to business interruption, physical damage, and collateral damage 
for the population and economy as a whole. The capacity of a modern society to preserve the 
conditions of its existence is intimately linked to the proper operation of its critical 
infrastructures. Cybersecurity concerns are the main challenge faced by the operators of such 
infrastructures, not least because of the high degree of interconnection [14]. This raises the 
threat of a so-called “cyber subprime scenario”, i.e., a cascading series of failures from an 
attack that aims to exploit this interconnectivity.4 Because of this situation, many agents 
                                               
2 ISACs have been introduced following the Presidential Decision Directive-63 (PDD-63) in 1998. PDD-63 
recognized the potential for the critical infrastructures of the USA to be attacked either through physical or 
cyber means with the intent to affect the military or economic power of the country. 
3 The Reporting and Analysis Centre for Information Assurance (Melde- und Analysestelle 
Informationssicherung - MELANI) is a public-private-partnership (PPP) that gathers Swiss critical 
infrastructures and other partners active in the area of information systems and Internet security. 
4 In a 2014 report, the Atlantic Council and Zurich Insurance revealed that the interconnected 2008 global financial 
crisis bears several resemblances to what could happen in a major cyber “risk nexus” scenario (Atlantic Council, 
Zurich Insurance, Risk Nexus Report, 2014). 
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interested in sharing security information can likely be found in this context, such that data 
availability was facilitated. Indeed, prior research has highlighted the potential contribution of 
SIS to critical infrastructure protection [9]. 
 The remainder of this paper is structured as follows: Section 2 surveys related work and 
connects different streams of theories in order to link SIS and incentives. A system model and 
various hypotheses are presented in Section 3. The research methodology, the data collection 
process, and the demography of the participants are described in Section 4. Detailed results and 
the corresponding insights are presented in Section 5; the tables containing the raw results in 
full can be found in the appendix. The conclusion, limitations, and future work are described 
in Section 6. 
 
2. Related Work 
In this section, we survey works related to SIS in four main categories. 
 
Free-Riding 
Human cooperation is fraught with negative externalities that cannot be completely 
internalized. A particular human agent may benefit by receiving information from others while 
refusing to share such information, making him or her free-ride on the value of security 
information provided by others. As other agents anticipate this behaviour, they would refuse 
to share such information. As a result, a Nash-stable, yet inefficient, equilibrium emerges in 
which each cybersecurity agent attempts to free-ride on the investments of others. Hence, the 
overall level of SIS would be low and cybersecurity investment would – again – fail to attain 
its efficient optimum [16,17]. As a result, the global level of cybersecurity in the economy is 
unlikely to ever reach its theoretical optimum, unless human agents are incentivized to 
mutually participate in SIS activities [10,14,15,17]. 
 
Link between SIS and Incentives 
Therefore, the under-investment problem cannot be alleviated unless human agents are 
provided with appropriate incentives to engage in SIS [19]. Recent research has therefore 
stressed the need to study the link between incentives and SIS [12, 27]. A theoretical 
understanding of which incentives would encourage humans to engage in SIS (and why) is 
required to solve the cybersecurity investment problem [8,13,20,21]. However, to the best of 
our knowledge, such contributions do not yet exist as of today. This paper therefore constitutes 
a first attempt to propose a theory linking incentives and SIS, and to empirically test this theory. 
In principle, human agents can be motivated positively (i.e., with rewards if they behave in the 
desired way) or negatively (by forcing them to comply and threatening them with punishment 
if they do not). As a result, incentives for SIS can be provided either positively, by increasing 
the economic and social rewards reaped when agents share security information, or negatively, 
by punishing agents that fail to share [22–24].5 
 
Regulation 
To date, governments have experimented with regulation, by attempting to force government 
institutions and private sector firms to engage in SIS and by defining sanctions for failing to 
                                               
5 For example, the USA created the 2002 Sarbanes-Oxley Act and the 2015 Cybersecurity Information Sharing 
Act (CISA). In December 2015, the European Parliament and Council agreed on the first EU-wide legislation on 
cybersecurity, adopting the EU Network and Information Security (NIS) Directive. The EU General Data 
Protection Regulation (GDPR) aims to harmonize and unify existing EU privacy breach reporting obligations. 
Like other union breach notification laws, both the GDPR and the NIS Directive impose fines to ensure 
compliance [9]. 
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comply. However, reviews suggest that such regulatory attempts, as well as “walls of shame”6, 
did not seem to produce the desired effect of increased SIS [3,11,22,23,24]. This disappointing 
result might be due to the effect that, when forced to share security information, human agents 
choose to share irrelevant or incomplete information, especially so if they are compelled to 
share information with competitors [26]. This regulatory failure does not seem to be country-
specific, as regulatory attempts in other countries have also produced limited results [27]. 
 
Model 
Our theoretical system model focuses on a positive reinforcement: we argue that SIS will 
increase if agents are provided with appropriate positive incentives to share information. As 
cybersecurity problems are unlikely to be solved by information systems theory alone, we 
adopt an interdisciplinary approach, as recommended by recent work [30]. Existing 
behavioural, sociological and psychological research shows that human agents are motivated 
to act in a particular way when they believe that, as a result of such actions, they can improve 
their economic or social position [30,31,32,33]. All in all, the literature suggests that human 
volition (i.e., a choice made by will) is changed as a result of the expected costs and benefits 
associated with particular actions: human agents ask themselves what would make them share 
security information. We therefore propose that SIS is a function of different incentives. 
 
3. Theoretical Framework and Hypotheses 
 
Although many incentives exist, prior conceptual and exploratory works suggest five main 
incentives that each should significantly increase human agents’ willingness to engage in SIS 
[17,35,36]. These incentives are all based on the expectation that (1) sharing will be 
reciprocated; (2) the information received from the transaction partner will be valuable; (3) 
sharing will be facilitated by an effective institutional design; (4) sharing will be beneficial for 
the reputation of the organization the agent works for; and (5) the transaction partner can be 
trusted. We posit that these expectations change the individual agents’ assessments of the 
potential outcomes of a sharing transaction. Hence, their positive expectations of these issues 
would motivate them to engage in actual SIS. Figure 1 below illustrates our proposed model. 
 
 
Figure 1: System model linking incentives and SIS where trust between human agents is both 
a moderator and predicator. Incentives change expectations, modifying the behaviour of 
human agents to increase voluntary SIS. 
                                               
6 The Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act (HIPAA) requires reporting breaches of protected 
health information (PHI) to the U. S. Department of Health and Human Services (HHS). Public access to current 
reported breaches should give regulated entities more incentive to maintain high privacy and security standards, 
in order to stay off of the “wall of shame”. 
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Reciprocity refers to the effect that the propensity of human agents to engage in a particular 
behaviour depends on the extent to which such behaviour is reciprocated by the transaction 
partner. Hence, the expectations of such reciprocity should be the basis for the extent to which 
they share information [29]. Social psychology research suggests that when agents are treated 
in a particular way, they respond likewise (reciprocate). For example, peer-to-peer (P2P) 
systems often confront the problem of free riders (or so called ‘leechers’), because most 
participants often prefer to avoid contributing while enjoying the benefits of the network. As a 
result, most P2P networks have been forced to remove free riders, or to turn them into forced 
riders by making contributions mandatory. As in the “tit-for-tat” strategy, evolutionary biology 
defines reciprocal altruism as a behaviour where an organism acts in a manner that temporarily 
reduces its fitness while increasing another organism’s fitness, with the expectation that the 
other organism will act in a similar manner [30]. Open-source studies have shown that, in the 
absence of an expectation of reciprocity, the benefits that a P2P network can provide are 
unlikely to be realized [31]. Reciprocity can be self-reinforcing, because participants will share 
more when provided with an incentive that ensures reciprocity [32]. Hence, 
 Hypothesis 1: SIS will increase with the extent to which a human agent expects SIS to be 
reciprocated. 
 
Value of Information measures the benefit that an agent expects to gain from a good and/or a 
service. A convenient proxy for this measure is the maximum amount of money a specific 
agent is willing to pay for a good or service [33]. Previous studies have identified the value 
expectation of the information obtained by sharing as an important precursor to SIS [21]. SIS 
and cooperation between industry peers can improve the relevance, quality, and value of 
information, because different human agents often face similar cyber-threats [34]. 
 Nevertheless, SIS can be an extra burden on the participants if they lack the resources to 
understand and analyse the security information that is shared with them. Therefore, each agent 
is expected to conduct a cost-benefit analysis before deciding whether or not to engage in SIS. 
The benefits would increase as the value expectation of the information increases; ideally, an 
agent will conclude that the benefits of the security information received outweigh the costs of 
the security information shared. For the participants, cost saving is generally the most direct 
and visible benefit of SIS. Hence, 
 Hypothesis 2 (H2): SIS will increase with the extent to which a human agent expects to 
receive valuable information in return. 
 
Institutional Barriers are an important precursor to sharing outcomes. For example, 
contractual rules regarding the processing and labelling of shared information, as well as the 
secure storage and access to shared data, influence sharing outcomes [12]. Moreover, a clear 
taxonomy and framework is needed to create a common terminology and culture for 
participants before sharing transactions can be made [4]. Such basic arrangements could serve 
as a precursor to actual sharing and this is likely to be implemented by contractual institutions 
that define common standards of language use and processes. Hence, the motivation for human 
agents to engage in SIS is likely influenced by the extent to which they expect an effective 
institutional design that facilitates sharing transactions. For example, such effective institutions 
restrict membership in sharing organizations to make SIS attractive to an outside agent, to 
secure minimum quality standards for the information shared, and to avoid the entry of free 
riders into the sharing process [12]. Hence, 
 Hypothesis 3 (H3): SIS will increase with the extent to which a human agent expects SIS to 
be facilitated by effective institutions. 
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Reputation indicates a value judgment about an agent’s attributes. Corporate reputation, for 
instance, evolves over time as a result of consistent performance, and is reinforced by effective 
communication [35]. Agents can evaluate the potential reputational benefits of their SIS 
activities, as well as potential reputational risks. Participants are often reluctant to share 
information about cybersecurity incidents, as such information might reveal discomforting 
incidents such as security breaches, data theft, or blackmailing [36]. Reputation is based on 
customer trust, the protection of customer data, and the quality of service offered [7]. Common 
fears include information leaks and the use by competitors of critical information to damage 
the reputation of the client [37]. Disclosing information about cyber-attacks might therefore 
reduce consumer trust hence negatively influence a firm’s market value [2]. As a result, agents 
have a strong incentive to engage in SIS if they believe that by sharing they can limit their 
firm’s exposure to reputational risks. Hence,  
 Hypothesis 4 (H4): SIS will increase with the extent to which a human agent expects a 
positive effect of SIS on corporate reputation. 
 
Trust is a belief that a particular human agent is honest, reliable, good and effective [38]. This 
belief is formed within agents over time as a result of repeated personal interactions that lead 
to positive outcomes for the sharing agent [54]. Hence, trust is a significant predictor of a 
human agent’s willingness to engage in SIS because such belief reduces the reluctance that 
exists when any particular human agent is asked to share security information with an unknown 
stranger [2,46,48]. Therefore,  
 Hypotheses 5 (H5): SIS will increase with the extent to which human agents that share 
security information trust each other. 
 
Besides this direct effect of trust on SIS, we believe that trust should also positively moderate 
each relationship postulated in H1 through H4. Hence, the four main effects hypothesized 
would be even stronger as the trust increases among the agents. First, trust reduces the 
transaction cost of human interaction and creates a belief among the sharing agents that another 
transaction will be just as beneficial to them as prior transactions. Pre-existing trust in an 
exchange relationship has been shown to positively influence the reciprocity of subsequent 
exchanges [49,50]. Hence, trust should positively moderate the reciprocity expectation because 
in a trusted relationship there is less risk associated with an act of sharing not being 
reciprocated. In other words, past transactions that have created trust among the sharing agents 
can positively influence future transactions [42]. Second, in the absence of trust, the value of 
information received in a sharing transcation can only imperfectly be predicted by the receiving 
agent. However, in the presence of trust the agent likely anticipates that the information 
received will be valuable with high probabilty hence should have a stronger motivation to 
share. Third, behavioural research suggests that institutions are more effective when prior trust 
between human agents exists [51,52,53]. Fourth and finally, in many jurisdictions, 
governments and private industries have worked together to create networks in an attempt to 
support the emergence of trusted relationships between human agents [45,46]. Human agents 
active in such networks are likely to communicate their membership to external stakeholders 
and the public in order to improve corporate reputation. Hence, 
 Hypotheses 6a-d (H6 a-d): The relationships between the value of information (reciprocity, 
institutional barriers, reputation) expectation and SIS are positively moderated by the extent 
to which human agents in a sharing transaction trust each other. 
 
4. Methods 
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Specification and Measurement of Constructs 
We operationalized and tested our hypotheses as follows. As we postulate relationships 
between individual-level expectation and perception, modelling the influence of these on 
individual behaviour (i.e., sharing information), our study is set at the individual level of 
analysis. Hence, the individual who decides to share, or not, security-relevant information is 
the unit of analysis. For these reasons, we opted for a psychometric approach [48] that measures 
all constructs directly at the individual level. Data on all constructs was collected from 
individual respondents through a questionnaire instrument. Validated academic procedures of 
questionnaire design [49] informed its production. The questionnaire was developed as a paper 
instrument first. Then we pretested it with focus groups from academia and the cybersecurity 
industry; we used the feedback to improve the visual presentation of the questionnaire and to 
add additional explanations. The feedback received during this phase indicated that 
respondents could make valid and reliable assessments, which alleviated concerns about the 
approximation nature of shared unit-level constructs [50]. 
 
Population 
The questionnaire was implemented among the 424 participants of the closed user group of the 
Swiss Reporting and Analysis Centre for Information Assurance (MELANI).7 This 
organization is an ISAC, i.e., a government organization that provides a platform to facilitate 
SIS between Critical Infrastructures (CIs). These agents decide freely whether or not to share 
information, such that their individual behaviour also determines the behaviour of the firm or 
government organization they represent. The sharing environment is organized as a forum in 
which participants from the information security technology sector and CI providers share 
security information. MELANI is organized as a public-private partnership between the Swiss 
federal government and the private sector. The closed user group in this organization comprises 
senior industry managers from diverse industries; who all are in charge of providing 
cybersecurity for their respective firms. For all of these members, the exchange of SIS is 
important, as they operate critical infrastructures8 that are ultimately all connected. Hence, if 
they share they can learn from each other and make individual protection stronger if they share. 
This group of 424 individuals constitutes an ideal population from which we drew our sample 
to empirically test our hypotheses. We used the number of years a particular manager was a 
member with MELANI served as a proxy to control for prior SIS experience. 
 
Implementation 
Within this closed user group, both MELANI officials and members communicate with each 
other in English. Switzerland has four official languages, none of which is English, and all 
constructs we used for measurement were originally published in English, we also 
implemented the questionnaire9 in the English language to exclude any back-translation 
problems from the onset. Before implementation, we conducted pre-tests to make sure 
respondents had the necessary language skills. The cover page of the survey informed 
respondents about the research project and our goals and also made clear that we had no 
financial or business-related interest. 
 We implemented the questionnaire as an online survey, employing the SelectSurvey 
software, provided free of charge by the Swiss Federal Institute of Technology in Zurich 
                                               
7 https://www.melani.admin.ch/melani/en/home.html (last accessed January 12, 2018). 
8 They are professionally affiliated with the banking and finance (38% of all members), government (26%), energy 
(11%), telecommunication / IT (6%), insurance (6%) transport and logistics (6%), industry (3%), health (3%) and 
the chemical / pharmaceutical industries (1%). 
9 For limited space reasons, the original questionnaire is available upon request from the corresponding author. 
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(ETHZ).10 For reasons of data security, the survey was hosted on proprietary servers of the 
ETHZ. The data were captured in an anonymized and voluntary way. The management of 
MELANI invited all closed-user-group members to respond to the survey by sending an 
anonymized access link, such that the anonymity of respondents was guaranteed at all times. 
Respondents were free to reply, and no pressure from MELANI or the authors of this paper 
was exerted at any time. As a reward for participation, respondents were offered a free of 
charge research report free of charge that summarized the responses. 
 
Dependent Variables 
To capture sharing activities in a multidimensional way, we operationalize SIS by two distinct 
dependent variables: frequency and intensity (of sharing). Frequency measures the amount of 
times information is shared between agents, whereas intensity measures the depth of sharing 
interaction. A simple count could be deceptive, as many sharing transactions do not necessarily 
indicate that important information is shared in each transaction, and vice versa, as much highly 
relevant information be shared in very few or even a single transaction. Frequency was 
operationalized by a multi-item scale adopted from the literature (viz. Table 1 on p. 18 in the 
appendix). Intensity was measured by an ordered categorical variable that captured how 
intensely MELANI members would respond to a particular sharing transaction. The variable 
comprised seven categories (never; rarely, in less than 10% of the chances when I could have; 
occasionally, in about 30% of the chances when I could have, etc., until “every time”). We 
opted for this ordered-categorical approach, so people could estimate and would not be deterred 
by the need to provide exact percentage figures. We also captured an alternative measure by 
means of a Likert scale, but during the empirical analysis, we found that the ordered categorical 
variable fits the data better.  
 
Independent Variables 
All independent variables are measured by psychometric scales that each comprise several 
items. They were adapted from prior empirical literature [9] wherever possible, in order to 
establish good measurement accuracy by using validated measurement instruments. These 
scales, their items and Cronbach alphas are all detailed in Table 1 on p.17 of the appendix. All 
of the items these scales comprise are Likert-scaled; respondents could express their view vis-
à-vis each item by choosing from a five-point scale anchored at “strongly disagree” and 
“strongly agree”, with “neutral” as the midpoint. To construct each scale, we added its 
individual item scores and subsequently divided the sum by the number of items in it [51]. All 
independent variables were measured in a single construct, with the exception of reciprocity 
which was captured by two variables. Reciprocity (social) captured respondents’ expectations 
to be socially rewarded for SIS, whereas reciprocity (transactional) captured the expectation 
that SIS constitute an arm’s-length transaction for which concrete compensation in monetary 
or career terms is expected. 
 
Controls 
To capture heterogeneity among individuals, we controlled for the respondent’s gender, age, 
education level, and length of membership with MELANI, because expectation of SIS gained 
during membership might influence a respondent’s sharing behaviour. Gender was coded 
dichotomously (male, female). Age was captured in four mutually exclusive categories (21-30, 
31-40, 41-50, 50+ years). Education was captured by six mutually exclusive categories 
(Bachelor, Diploma, Master, none, other, PhD). We finally controlled for the industry 
                                               
10 IT support received free of charge during implementation is gratefully acknowledged. 
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affiliation of the firm the respondent is affiliated with. The selection of relevant controls was 
informed by prior empirical research in the field of economics of cybersecurity [52]. 
 
Data Collection 
The online questionnaire and the reminders were sent to the population by the Deputy Head of 
MELANI, which gave a strong credibility and endorsement to the participants. The survey link 
was sent in an e-mail describing the authors, the data, the contact for support, as well as the 
reward and the definition and scope of the study. Data collection began on October 12, 2017 
and finished on December 1, 2017. Two reminders were sent on October 26 and November 9, 
2017. When data collection ended, 262 responses had been collected, of which 189 fully 
completed questionnaires (72%). Overall, the survey response rate is 63%. Statistical analysis 
was done with STATA.11 
 
Post-hoc Tests 
We tested response patterns for systematic differences between “early” and “late” replies and 
for a potential influence of total response time as respondents could save intermediate 
questionnaire completions and return to the survey and complete it at a later point in time. The 
analysis did not suggest any specific influence. After data collection was complete, we tested 
the reliability and validity of both our items and our scales by using diverse approaches. All of 
these methods consistently indicate high levels of reliability and validity. The reliability of our 
items was tested by calculating item-test, item-rest, and average inter-item correlations, and 
the reliability of our scales was verified by calculating Cronbach’s alpha [48]. The convergent 
validity of our scales was assessed by applying the principal component factor analysis with 
oblique rotation. This analysis suggested eight factors with an eigenvalue about unity. High 
direct factor-loadings and low cross-loadings indicate a high degree of convergent validity 
[53]. The first factor explained 13.4% of the total variance. Hence, according to Harman’s one-
factor test, there seemed to be no significant common method variance in the sample [54]. The 
detailed factor-loadings and their diagnostic measures are given in Table 2 on p.20 of the 
appendix. 
 
Estimation 
For the dependent variable intensity, we estimated ordered probit models, as the variable is 
measured by six mutually exclusive and hierarchical categories. Akaike information criteria 
were used to compare the goodness of fit. For the dependent variable frequency, we estimated 
tobit models as this variable is conditioned on values between 1 and 5 [55]. We incrementally 
built all models by first entering only the controls in a baseline model and then adding the 
covariates one by one. In both estimations, we mean centered the independent variables before 
entering them into the analysis. 
 
5. Results 
 
Table 3 provides descriptive statistics for all variables. Table 4 specifies Spearman 
correlations; for the sake of brevity, correlates are shown between dependent and independent 
variables only. Table 5 documents the two final, best-fitting models and their respective 
diagnostic measures.12 We judged our hypotheses on the basis of these final models. H1 is 
                                               
11 When data collection was complete, the data were exported from the survey application, manually inspected 
for consistency and then converted into a STATA (v.13) dataset on which all further statistical analysis was 
performed. 
12 Further detailed information about these procedures is available from the corresponding author. 
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partially supported. The value of information a human agent expects to receive as a result of 
sharing security information significantly increases the intensity of SIS (p < 0.05), but not its 
frequency. H2 is fully supported insofar as social reciprocity is concerned, and partially insofar 
as transactional reciprocity is concerned. Social reciprocity significantly increases both the 
intensity (p < 0.05) and the frequency (p < 0.05) of SIS. Transactional reciprocity significantly 
increases the frequency of sharing (p < 0.01), but not its intensity. H3 is strongly supported. 
Effective institutional design significantly increases both frequency (p < 0.001) and intensity 
(p < 0.01) of SIS. Note that the negative sign on both coefficients is due to the variable 
institutional barriers being reverse-coded, such that ineffective institutional design reduces 
both frequency and intensity of SIS (in line with our theoretical expectation). H4 is not 
supported. Reputation is neither a significant predictor for the frequency nor for the intensity 
of SIS. H5 is partially supported.  
 Trust between human agents significantly increases the frequency (p < 0.01), but not the 
intensity of sharing. Finally, partial support is found for the moderating role of trust. It 
negatively and significantly moderates the relationship between value and the intensity (p < 
0.05), but not the frequency (p < 0.05) of SIS, lending partial support to Hypothesis 6a. It also 
negatively and significantly moderates the relationship between transactional reciprocity and 
SIS, both for frequency (p < 0.05) and intensity (p < 0.01), thus lending full support to 
Hypothesis 6b. All other interaction effects are insignificant, hence Hypotheses 6c and 6d are 
rejected. Education, regardless of the education level, is negatively associated with the 
frequency (each p < 0.05), but not the intensity of SIS. Neither gender, nor the age, length of 
membership in MELANI, nor industry affiliation is a significant predictor of SIS.  
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6. Discussion 
 
To the best of our knowledge, our paper represents the first empirical study of security 
information sharing (SIS) among human agents in an actual Information Sharing and Analysis 
Centre (ISAC). We have provided a theoretical explanation for SIS in an interdisciplinary way 
by drawing on prior behavioural economics, psychology, and information systems research. 
Five specific predictors (reciprocity, value, institutional barriers, reputation, trust) were 
elaborated from these prior works, and SIS is regressed on these. Furthermore, we have offered 
a multidimensional measure of SIS by differentiating between the frequency and the intensity 
of security information shared. 
 The results suggest that the frequency and the intensity of SIS are caused by different 
motivations. The expectation of both social and transactional returns, as well as the level of 
trust between sharing agents, seems to be a strong incentive for frequency. Whereas, the 
expected value of the information received in return, as well as reciprocity, seems to be a 
motivating factor for intensity. Hence, the frequency of SIS resembles a pattern of continuous, 
business-like exchange that intensifies as trust is built by continuous cooperation, whereas the 
intensity of SIS seems to be primarily based on the value an agent expects to receive in return. 
In this regard, trust is not a significant predictor, implying that agents will not share in-depth 
information unless they can reasonably expect an equal return. Expectations about reciprocity 
significantly influence both dimensions of SIS. Our results confirm that both social and 
transactional reciprocity are powerful adaptive mechanisms that can trigger feelings of 
indebtedness even when faced with an uninvited favour [56,57]. Hence, once agents reasonably 
believe that, in the long term, the beneficial results of reciprocity will win out over short term 
self-interest, they would more likely share security information. This finding is in line with 
prior theoretical expectations [58]. 
 
Generalisation 
All in all, our findings point to the importance of human behaviour when studying information 
systems. To date, theoretical information systems research dominates the study of information 
security, whereas interdisciplinary approaches are desirably, but largely missing [59]. To our 
knowledge of the literature, very few contributions study SIS among actual human agents, and 
none is empirical [6]. Given that SIS, when done successfully, is an activity generating social 
benefits [6], this lack of evidence seems problematic.  
 Our paper is a first attempt towards closing this gap, and we propose that actual information 
sharing between human agents should be studied in a variety of contexts. We obtained our 
results by analysing a sample of decision-making agents who operate and protect critical 
infrastructures in a single country. However, we do not believe that our results are necessarily 
limited to those particular contexts. None of the explanatory constructs we offer is contingent 
on particular nation-states, cultures, or idiosyncratic contexts. They rather represent basic traits 
of human volition and organization that can be identified globally. 
 Furthermore, our results inform about research on behavioural aspects in information 
security by showing how and why expectations about future benefits can provide incentives 
for human agents to exhibit particular actions [28]. Our results can thus serve help to formulate 
policies and institutional designs that replace non-cooperation and free-riding by productive 
sharing behaviour. Specifically, we suggest how human agents could be ‘nudged’ to cooperate 
by providing them with conducive expectations that sharing will improve their position and 
benefit. Our results support the view that the effectiveness of regulation in stimulating 
productive human behaviour is limited, and that positive reinforcement and indirect 
suggestions should be used instead [60]. 
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Recommendations 
In both models, the variable institutional barriers variable is a negative and significant 
predictor for both the frequency and the intensity of SIS. These results point to the importance 
of proper institutional design. Human agents cannot be expected to voluntarily engage in SIS 
unless they are provided with a safe and conducive organizational environment that facilitates 
SIS. As there is an ongoing global debate about whether or not SIS should be mandatory, 
policymakers should be cautious about preferring regulation as they attempt to incentivize 
human agents to engage in SIS. Our results show that reciprocity is a significant predictor for 
both the frequency and the intensity of SIS. Reciprocity is a social norm of responding to a 
positive action with another positive action and cannot be instituted by regulation and 
constraint. If forced, agents might even share irrelevant, non-timely, or false information [61]. 
Adjusting sanction levels for failure to comply with mandatory SIS could also be difficult, if 
not impossible [6]. All in all, our results suggest that providing positive incentives seems to be 
a more promising way to encourage human agents share security information – thus confirming 
propositions formulated before [62]. We propose that a liberal environment is probably more 
conducive for information security than a coercive one, at least insofar as the cooperation of 
human agents is required. For example, in the ISAC we studied, human agents’ fears about 
data leaks are mitigated by the introduction of ‘trust circles’ that reflect a particular agent’s 
willingness to engage in SIS. Participants can share security information with ISAC staff only 
(first circle), selected industry peers (second circle) or all members (third circle). For each SIS 
transaction, participants can choose which circle (i.e., the level of privacy) they want to 
communicate with. We believe that such effective institutional designs are more conducive 
than formal regulation, when it comes to incentivizing agents to engage in SIS. 
 This study differs from prior work in the sense that empirical observations are provided 
from observing actual human agents in an actual ISAC. Consequently, the results have 
important implications for the development of the IT security industry. As our results confirm 
the negative influence of institutional obstacles both for the frequency and the intensity of SIS, 
they point to the fact that effective sharing is not only about human behaviour, but also about 
a conducive institutional environment. Switzerland offers an ideal environment for SIS (high 
level of trust in institutions, low corruption rate). 
 Our findings both inform the reviews of existing ISACs, as well as the design of formally 
established Information Sharing and Analysis Organizations (ISAOs). Furthermore, given that 
‘big data’ analytics implicate disruptive technological change in the IT security industry, our 
results are likely relevant for the technical and institutional design of information security 
operation centres or fusion centres, i.e., organizations designed to promote information sharing 
between national and international agencies [63]. For example, both the threat intelligence 
platform and cyber-threat intelligence technologies must rely on effective SIS as agents are 
expected to mutually share real-time threat data. Therefore, the creation of these technologies 
should not only be informed from an information systems viewpoint but be corroborated with 
an institutional perspective. 
 
Future Work 
Future research could build on our work in a variety of ways. The authors of this study are 
currently preparing a policy recommendations paper at a meso-level of analysis in order to 
deliver insights for legislators willing to design better ISACs. Our empirical approach focused 
on four main effects that together explain about 68% of the sample variance. Additional 
explanatory variables could be conceived to expand our model. For example, in our research 
we did not consider altruism. Human agents can share information although they do not 
necessarily expect a social or transactional return, as a gesture of goodwill, or as an initial step 
to build trust among participants. Future studies could also consider predictors that model 
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individual perception of risk, as the willingness to share information among human agents can 
be expected to grow with the risk of economic damage as a result of information not shared. 
For example, human agents whose organizations exhibit systemic risks (e.g., ‘too big to fail’ 
banks) might be more inclined towards SIS if provided with appropriate incentives. 
 Future studies could set the level of analysis on the industry rather than on human agents. 
Surprisingly, the financial sector has the highest level of engagement in SIS activities and was 
the sector most willing to join MELANI at its foundation a decade ago. This has enabled the 
sector to build trust over time, based on already existing relationships and the regular face-to-
face meetings at workshops or roundtables that take place between the MELANI staff and their 
contacts in the banks. Even though impediments remain to the development of effective SIS in 
this specific industry, including legal issues that deter CI providers from engaging in SIS 
activities: including antitrust laws, patent protection, national security laws, and data privacy 
laws, such as the Swiss banking secrecy laws. These legal issues make problematic the sharing 
of client-related data, especially in cross-border or multi-jurisdictional contexts, where 
attackers can find multiple “offshore” entry points to an organization. 
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APPENDIX 
 
Table 1: Constructs, items and scales used in the survey 
 
Scale / 
Construct 
Item Wording Sources 
from 
which 
items 
were 
adapted 
Cronbach 
alpha 
Frequency ISKS1 I frequently share my experience about information security with MELANI [52] 0.8945 
ISKS2 I frequently share my information security knowledge with MELANI 
ISKS3 I frequently share my information security documents with MELANI 
ISKS4 I frequently share my expertise from my information security training with MELANI 
ISKS5 I frequently talk with others about information security incidents and their solutions in 
MELANI workshops 
Value of 
information 
AT2 I believe SIS is a useful behavioural tool to safeguard the organization's information 
assets 
[52] 0.6761 
AT3 My SIS has a positive effect on mitigating the risk of information security breaches 
AT4 SIS is a wise behaviour that decreases the risk of information security incidents 
Reciprocity 
(transactional) 
HR1 I expect to be rewarded with a higher salary in return for sharing knowledge with other 
participants 
[64] 0.7956 
HR2 I expect to receive monetary rewards (i.e., additional bonus) in return for sharing 
knowledge with other participants 
HR4 I expect to be rewarded with an increased job security in return for sharing knowledge 
with other participants 
Institutional 
barriers 
 
EC1 I cannot seem to find the time to share knowledge in the community [4] 0.7882 
EC2 It is laborious to share knowledge in the community 
EC3 It takes me too much time to share knowledge in the community 
EC4 The effort is high for me to share knowledge in the community 
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Reciprocity 
(social) 
NOR2 I believe that other people will help me when I need help if I share knowledge with others 
through MELANI 
[4] 0.7882 
NOR3 I believe that other people will answer my questions regarding specific information and 
knowledge in the future if I share knowledge with others through MELANI 
NOR4 I think that people who are involved with MELANI develop reciprocal beliefs on give 
and take based on other people's intentions and behaviour 
Reputation R1 Sharing knowledge can enhance my reputation in the community [65] 0.6996 
R2 I get praises from others by sharing knowledge in the community 
R3 I feel that knowledge sharing improves my status in the community 
R4 I can earn some feedback or rewards through knowledge sharing that represent my 
reputation and status in the community 
Trust TR1 I believe that my colleague's information security knowledge is reliable [52] 0.8598 
TR2 I believe that my colleague's information security knowledge is effective 
TR3 I believe that my colleague's information security knowledge mitigates the risk of 
information security breaches 
TR4 I believe that my colleague's information security knowledge is useful 
 
 
 
20 
Table 2: Final set of factor loadings after oblique rotationa 
                
Item Loading on oblimin-rotated factor            
  factor 1 factor 2 factor 3 factor 4 factor 5 factor 6 factor 7 Commonality  
ISKS1 0.8075       0.27 
ISKS2 0.8903       0.19 
ISKS3 0.885       0.20 
ISKS4 0.86       0.21 
ISKS5 0.6898       0.44 
AT2       0.7751 0.32 
AT3 0.3412      0.6376 0.38 
AT4       0.7849 0.31 
NOR2     0.8464   0.23 
NOR3     0.8714   0.18 
NOR4     0.6946   0.36 
HR1    0.8822    0.16 
HR2    0.8743    0.19 
HR4    0.7499    0.41 
EC1   0.6964     0.49 
EC2   0.695     0.45 
EC3   0.8626     0.21 
EC4   0.7913     0.32 
R1      0.6312  0.49 
R2      0.689  0.51 
R3      0.7922  0.29 
R4      0.7039  0.44 
TR1  0.751      0.36 
TR2  0.8688      0.21 
TR3  0.846      0.26 
TR4  0.8039      0.29 
Eigenvalue 3.786 2.951 2.502 2.329 2.24 2.142 1.851  
Proportion of  
variance explained 14.56% 11.35% 9.62% 8.96% 8.62% 8.24% 7.12%  
Cumulative  
variance explained 14.56% 25.91% 35.53% 44.49% 53.11% 61.34% 68.46%   
         
Notes to Table 2. 
a. Blank cells represent factor loadings of less than abs < 0.30 
 
 
 
21 
Table 3: Descriptive statistics on all variables 
 
Variable Obs Mean Std.Dev. Min Max 
Frequency 240 2.68 0.78 1 5 
Intensity 228 2.34 1.20 1 7 
Value of information 208 4.10 0.53 3 5 
Reciprocity (social) 195 3.88 0.60 1.66 5 
Reciprocity (transactional) 195 2.16 0.75 1 4 
Institutional design 208 3.14 0.65 1.25 5 
Trust 190 3.82 0.55 1.25 5 
Gender 260 1.04 0.20 1 2 
Age category 261 2.87 0.86 1 4 
Education category 260 2.58 1.25 1 6 
Membership duration 260 7.05 5.35 1 18 
 
 
Table 4: Correlations among dependent and independent variablesa 
 
        
               
 Frequency Intensity Value 
Reciprocity 
(social) 
Reciprocity 
(financial) 
Institutional 
design Trust 
Frequency 1       
Intensity 0.3547*** 1      
Value of information 0.2436*** 0.2742*** 1     
Reciprocity (social) 0.2602*** 0.2750*** 0.3798*** 1    
Reciprocity (transactional) 0.1836** 0.0456 -0.0901 0.000 1   
Institutional design -0.2238** -0.1694* -0.0976 -0.0314 0.1533* 1  
Trust 0.2279** -0.0101 0.2471*** 0.0269*** -0.1321 -0.1857*  
       
Notes to Table 4. 
a. Spearman correlations.  *p < 0.05; **p < 0.01; ***p < 0.001. 
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Table 5: Final results of model estimationsa,b 
 
  
Intensity of SIS 
(ordered probit 
estimation) 
Frequency of SIS 
(tobit estimation) 
 
Coefficient (std. error) Coefficient (std. error) 
Value of information 0.3964* (0.1862) 0.1627 (0.1165) 
Reciprocity (social) 0.3793* (0.1648) 0.2066* (0.1010) 
Reciprocity (transactional) 0.1614 (0.1194) 0.2276** (0.0749) 
Institutional barriers -0.4928*** (0.1396) -0.232** (0.0849) 
Reputation 0.1199 (0.1971) -0.091 (0.1243) 
Trust -0.154 (0.1684) 0.3189** (0.1060) 
Value x Trust -0.6254* (0.3159) -0.3260 (0.1960) 
Reciprocity (social) x Trust 0.1770 (0.2665) 0.1383 (0.1665) 
Reciprocity (transactional) x Trust -0.428* (0.2174) -0.3777** (0.1371) 
Institutional design x Trust 0.2400 (0.2495) -0.163 (0.1558) 
Reputation x Trust 0.4013 (0.3943) 0.1261 (0.2495) 
Gender -0.2311 (0.4152) 0.2014 (0.2601) 
Age 21-30 -0.1101 (0.3911) 0.2082 (0.2444) 
Age 31-40 0.1620 (0.2414) 0.0097 (0.1515) 
Age 41-50 0.0386 (0.2002) 0.0191 (0.1261) 
Education none -0.5686 (0.5732) -0.8007* (0.3612) 
Education Master -0.6672 (0.5621) -0.7931* (0.3544) 
Education Bachelor -0.1803 (0.5533) -0.7385* (0.3499) 
Education PhD -0.8225 (0.6173) -0.9552* (0.3883) 
Membership duration 0.0161 (0.0165) 0.0200 (0.0105) 
Government -0.2845 (0.3367) -0.0057 (0.2119) 
Banking / finance / industry -0.1578 (0.3025) 0.0307 (0.1900) 
All other industries -0.1950 (0.3378) -0.3791 (0.2127) 
Energy -0.0862 (0.3705) 0.2025 (0.2326) 
Health -0.2942 (0.3985) 0.0291 (0.2490) 
   
Constant 
 
3,058175*** (0.4718) 
   
Log likelihood -245.65 -197.15 
Pseudo R2 0.0928 0.1596 
LR χ2 (25 d.f.) 50.23 74.90 
p > χ2 0.002** 0.000*** 
Observations 188 188 
 
Notes to table 5.  
a. Two-tailed tests. Standard errors are given between parentheses. *p < 0.05; **p < 0.01; 
***p < 0.001 
b. Age category “above 50”, education category “PhD” and the telecommunication/IT 
industry serve as the respective control variable benchmarks. 
 
 
